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Depreciation Funds and Reserves in Public-utility
Rate Cases
Comments by Carl H. Nau
The editor of The Journal of Accountancy submitted for
my comment the foregoing paper by John H. Bickley in which
he comments, inter alia, upon certain statements contained in
the memorandum on “Treatment of replacement reserve funds”,
printed in The Journal of December, 1926.
In order to clear this discussion of certain misunderstandings
or failures of minds to meet, it may be well to seek some common
premise. The search for this starting point naturally leads to a
consideration of the purpose of public regulation of utilities.
I believe that, broadly stated, the only justification for this
regulation is the preservation of the equities between the utility
and the consumer. Regulatory bodies have, therefore, generally
attempted to fix the rates for service at a point where the public
will pay such sum to the utility that the net income of the utility
will represent a fair return upon the investment which it has
made for the purpose of serving the public.
It was equity which dictated the use of “the fair value of the
property of a utility at the time the inquiry concerning rates
first arises” as the rate base, and in the end any attempt to inter
pret the laws so narrowly as to divest regulation of its real purpose
will result either in the enactment into law of provisions intended
to restore public control to its proper estate or in killing the goose
that lays the golden egg.
Therefore, in approaching further discussion of the “Treatment
of replacement reserve funds ” let us consider “law” and “equity ”
as synonymous terms when and as applied to this question of
regulation. The writer also wishes it to be understood that when
he speaks of a utility having been “brought under regulation,”
he does not have in mind the mere enactment of the regulatory
law, but rather the actual determination of the rate base and rate
for the utility in question by the properly constituted regulatory
body. I made a distinction in the life of the utility between the
time when it operated unregulated and uncontrolled, charged
all that the “traffic would bear” and took all of the gamble for
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either loss or unconscionable profit, and the time when the regu
latory body initially determined the rate base. After this time
the accounts, which have been prescribed, automatically ac
cumulate the cost of all additions to the property which, of
necessity, would ultimately be reflected in authorized additional
securities, either capital stock or bonds. If regulation is effective
and the return on the investment is a fair one, there will be no
ultimate increase in surplus out of which to finance additions to
property.
By regulation of utilities the public has sought to secure to
itself the benefits which arise from monopoly in public service
without assuming the burdens which generally attend such
monopoly. In return it should obligate itself to insure the sta
bility of investments in property devoted to its service. If this
be sound, no one could argue that a regulated utility, having been
authorized to sell its securities and invest the proceeds in equip
ment at peak prices should at a subsequent time be forced to
accept a return on this same equipment computed at normal
prices, simply because the market had declined in the meantime.
The converse applies equally well. Simply because of an upward
turn of the market the utility should not be permitted to seek a
revision of a value once determined. If the precedents be not in
accord with this doctrine, they will have to be reversed or the
machinery of equitable regulation will break down.
In order that my contentions may be entirely clear I have
deliberately assumed the risk of being criticized for injecting an
academic tone into this discussion, and, before passing to the
remarks directly concerning the paper of Mr. Bickley, I wish to
state it is my assumption that the only justification for a deprecia
tion allowance is the fact that the gradual wasting of assets would
otherwise result in a loss of value. I also wish to register the
assumption that the value determined at the time of regulation
is “fair” value, since the acts of regulatory bodies are not final
and the parties to the inquiry have recourse to the courts.
In discussing Mr. Bickley’s paper, I believe that every point
which is relevant can be brought out by commenting upon the
example of a utility having five units of property, each costing
$15,000.
The rate for service would, of course, have been so fixed that
the utility could earn a fair return on $75,000 which, at the rate
of return assumed by Mr. Bickley, would be $5,250 per annum.
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At the end of the third year the accumulated reserve for deprecia
tion would be $15,000 (under the scheme presented, the fund
would also be $15,000, whether in cash, or invested in securities
or additions to property), but during the three years there would
have been a loss in value in the original units of $15,000 so that
after investing in a new unit the fair value would still be $75,000—
represented by $60,000 remaining value in the five units and
$15,000 in the new unit. (If the fund had been used in defraying
the cost of the new unit it would be represented on the books by
the contra credit to the account “Borrowings from deferred
upkeep fund”.)
It may be well at this point to consider the reasons for purchas
ing the new unit. If it were purchased to keep the plant up to
its original capacity and efficiency without any increase in output,
then the analysis above is complete. However, if there were an
increased demand which necessitated the installation of the
additional unit, the utility would have a right to provide such
additional capacity out of the proceeds of new securities, and the
investment (or value of the plant) for rate-making purposes
would be $90,000, consisting of $60,000 remaining value of the
original units, $15,000 depreciation fund, and $15,000 of property
financed by the sale of new securities.
One difficulty which is always met in the discussion of any
phase of depreciation is the complexity of the subject. This
practically causes us to lose sight of the fundamentals and to
reason in terms of derivatives.
Let us consider a utility which has been under regulation from
the beginning and we shall probably agree that such utility is
entitled to a fair return upon the money, or money’s worth, which
it has been authorized to invest in the service which it renders.
Depreciation is invariably taken into consideration as an element
of cost in determining the rate for service which is necessary to
yield fair return.
In the case of a utility which has a franchise for a fixed term
and which will cease operation at a definite time, the depreciation
allowance must be such that during its period the utility will
have had a fair return on its investment and, when it ceases
operation, will be in a position to retire its securities at par.
In the case of a utility having a grant which, in effect, will
permit it to operate in perpetuity, the depreciation allowance
must be such that the utility will be able to keep its property in
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condition to earn its fair return and will be called upon to make
investment from the proceeds of new securities for only such
additions to property as are made necessary by increased demand
for service.
After complete consideration of Mr. Bickley’s paper, I am more
than ever convinced that the values upon which a utility is
entitled to a return are “the fair value determined at the time
the utility was brought under regulation plus the cost of such
subsequent extensions and betterments as are financed by the
sale of new securities” and that “the only interest which the
public has in the depreciation or replacement reserve funds is
that such funds be neither more nor less than necessary to replace
all property at the proper time and that they be available when
needed so that the public service will not suffer.”
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